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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DJ\VID W. HEATH and 
SUSAN N. HEATH, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
DONALD A. MOWER and FUTURE 
C0i'll!UNITY HOMES OF UTAH, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 16029 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, David W. Heath and Susan M. 
!Ieath, sued the defendants for breach of contract and 
for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
DISPOSITION IN TilE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer entered a default 
jud0ment and took evidence with respect to the issues 
of fraud and the personal liability of the defendant 
Donald A. Mower after a pretrial hearing on the 20th 
day of April, 1978, wherein the defendants failed to 
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appear either in person or by counsel. Appellants' sub-
sequent motion to set aside the default judgment in the 
sum of $13,241.95, including interest and court costs, 
was denied by Judge Palmer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the court's order denying 
the motion to set aside the default judgment sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts by reference the statement of 
facts set forth in the appellant's brief with the 
following exceptions: 
The statement of appellant Mower in his affidavit 
that he did not receive notice of a hearing bears care-
ful scrutiny in light of other facts, to wit: The 
amended notice of withdrawal of counsel contained a 
mailing certificate dated March 2, 1978, and there is 
no evidence that said mail was returned. Further, the 
pretrial notice was not only mailed to William H. 
Henderson but also to the defendant, Donald A. Mower 
(R.-78, 79). The mailgram upon which appellant relies 
so heavily lists his home address (R.-84), which is 
the same address to which the amended notice of with-
drawal was mailed (R.-80), and the same address to 
which the notice of pretrial was mailed on the 17th day 
-2-
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of March, 1978 (R.-79), and the same address to which 
counsel for repondent sent a letter certified mail, 
return receipt requested on the 13th day of March, 1978 
(R.-83, Exh. A). 
Further, defendant's affidavit is replete with 
other contradictions, for example: In the first full 
paragraph on Page 3 of appellant's brief, he repre-
sents that he first learned of the pretrial in a tele-
phone conversation with his wife on April 19th, but 
Paragraph 8 of his affidavit represents that this took 
place on April 18, 1978, giving him another full day in 
which to make contact with the court (R.-96). At the 
pretrial on April 20, 1978, the court clerk, Mrs. 
Barbara Unsworth, stated unequivocally to the court 
that her mailing of the notice of pretrial to the de-
fcnaant was not returned to the court clerk's office. 
Appellant states that the mailgram was received by the 
court on April 20, 1978, but not filed until the 24th 
day of April (appellant's brief, P. 3), but the minute 
entry contains a reference to the effect that no con-
tact has been made by Mr. Mower, and the court finds 
him in default (R.-81), and there is no evidence other-
wise. 
Next, in Paragraph 9 of the affidavit (R.-96), 
-3-
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appellant represents that in the mailgram he stated 
that he had received no notice of the hearing and that 
he did not have time to retain another attorney or to 
prepare for the hearing. One reading of the mailgram 
(R.-84) shows that both allegations are false. There 
Has no mention of lack of notice or that he did not have 
time to retain an attorney. 
Next, in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of his affidavit (R.-95), 
appellant avers that one of the notices was returned un-
claimed, and blandly states that no notice of the pre-
trial was ever received by him. He doesn't even attempt 
to explain why he did not claim the certified mail pur-
suant to the two notices delivered to him by the post 
office on March 18, 1978, and again on March 23, 1978. 
There is a difference in the notice of pretrial contained 
in the certified mail, Exhibit A, and the notice of 
pretrial sent by the court clerk. Note specifically the 
addition of the defendants' names to the certificate of 
mailing and the date of that certificate after the clerk 
received the amended notice of withdrawal of counsel con-
taining defendant Mower's address, which was filed with 
the court on Harch 10, 1978, two days after the original 
notices were mailed, showing a specific effort on the 
part of the court clerk to notify the defendants, advising 
-4-
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them to be present and represented by counsel ·if they so 
desired, and said notices were mailed a month before the 
pretrial was held, and defendant's former wife appeared 
and testified pursuant to that notice. 
Next, in his affidavit the appellant claims that he 
first learned of the pretrial hearing on April 18, 1978, 
through a telephone conversation with his former wife. 
But her testimony given at the trial shows that she had 
conversations with him about the pretrial long before 
the 18th day of April, 1978. 
Finally, appellant represents at the beginning of 
the second full paragraph on Page 2 of his brief that 
the default judgment first taken by respondent was set 
aside by the court "because of the failure to serve the 
appellants", and the statement is not factual. The 
record shows at Page 16-20 and 26-29 that appellant and 
his attorney at that time alleged as one of the grounds 
for setting aside the default judgment that appellant 
had not been properly served with process. After lengthy 
argument about jurisdiction of the court in Davis County 
and a representation of a defense and counterclaim, 
plaintiff stipulated to waive the default and allow the 
defendant to file his answer and plead his counterclaim, 
but defendant did nothing more until he was forced into 
-5-
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discovery by action of the plaintiff, and then defendant 
refused to complete the discovery as agreed at the deposi-
tion by furnishing additional materials to his attorney 
for inclusion in the deposition and failing to sign and 
file the deposition (R.-9lA, No. 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT UNDER 
(l) _1\.ND (7) OF RULE 60(b}, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 60 (b) (l} and (7) states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or its legal representative from the 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (l) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect ... (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. 
Appellent's mailgram (R.-84) and affidavit (R.-95,96) 
do not support the relief requested. The mailgram is 
completely void of any suggestion that appellant was 
taken by surprise or that there was any mistake in his 
conception of the court procedure, or that there was any 
inadvertence or excusable neglect. The document speaks 
for itself: "WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND THE MEETING AT 
YOUR OFFICE TODAY. AM ATTEflPTING TO FIND LOCAL ATTORNEY 
TO HANDLE THIS MATTER FOR ME." No reason is given as to 
why he is unable to attend or why he will not have an 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attorney. Mr. Henderson's withdrawal may well have 
been unexpected, but defendant was in Salt Lake City 
between the 20th day of March and the 20th day of April 
and was well aware of the pretrial conference. It is 
inconceivable that the defendant can allege mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect when he 
didn't even pick up certified mail after two notices 
from the post office. He doesn't allege that he was out 
of town at the time or that the mail got burned along 
with old bills, he doesn't make any explanation for 
failing to pick up the notice that showed that his 
attorney had withdrawn and gave the date of the pre-
trial. He doesn't even say that he didn't get notice 
from the post office that the letter was there. He 
simply states that the letter was returned unclaimed 
and implies that he therefore has no responsibility for 
the information contained therein. In Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), the 
court said at Page 743: 
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of 
justice, and the court will incline toward 
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end 
that the party may have a hearing ... however, 
the movant must show that he has used due dili-
gence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control. 
(emphasis added) 
-7-
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And at Page 744, the court said: 
In order for this court to overturn the discretion 
of the lower court in refusing to vacate a valid 
judgment, the requirements of public policy demand 
more than a mere statement that a person did not 
have his day in court when full opportunity for 
a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal 
representative. 
The exact same language was adopted by the court in 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 
513 P.2d 429 (1973, and the court confirmed again the 
same language in State v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1977). 
Appellant didn't even attempt to make contact with 
respondent or respondent's attorney even on the 18th day 
of April or the 19th, or the morning of the 20th, and 
the address of respondent's counsel was known to appel-
lant and was on the notice of pretrial. The notice of 
pretrial mailed by the clerk on the 17th day of March 
1978, specifically done to give appellant the notice he 
claims he was entitled to receive, was never returned 
to the clerk's office. The courts of this state have 
accorded to the U.S. mail sufficient reliability to pro-
vide for service by mail, and under Rule 5(b)(l), it 
states: 
( 1) l'lhenever under these rules service is 
required or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney, the service shall 
-8-
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be made upon the attorney unless service upon 
the party himself is ordered by the court. 
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall 
be made by delivering a copy to him or by mail-
ing it to him at his known address or, if no 
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk 
of the court ... service by mail is complete 
upon mailing. 
The clerk of the court made a specific effort to 
mail notice of the pretrial to defendant and certified 
that she did so. Appellant doesn't say in his affidavit 
that he didn't get the clerk's mail, he simply says that 
he didn't get the kind of notice that was in the certi-
fied letter, and that's true. The clerk's notice was 
much more explicit and contained directives which the 
defendant ignored. Paragraph 6 of appellant's affidavit 
is very much like Paragraph 2 of his first affidavit 
made to avoid service of process upon him (R.-16, No. 2). 
Appellant there said: "That there was never served upon 
affiant a copy of the summons in this action, and the 
first time affiant heard of said action was about 
January 9, 1976, by his attorney". But the record at 
Pages 9 and 10 show a summons and a constable's return 
under oath showing personal service upon the defendant, 
so it doesn't really matter whether you serve appellant 
personally or by mail, he just doesn't ever get served 
when he doesn't want to be. The court was perfectly 
justified in believing that lightning does not strike 
-9-
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twice in the same spot and that under all of the cir-
cumstances and especially appellant's unexplained fail-
ure to even pick up his certified mail, appellant's 
representations were not believable. 
The court stated in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 
2d 415, 303 P.2d 995 (1956) cited also in appellant's 
brief, at Page 996: 
At the hearing upon the motion to set aside 
the judgment, neither plaintiff nor his Nevada 
attorney appeared for cross-examination upon 
the facts alleged in their affidavits. His 
appeal seems to proceed upon the assumption 
that the court was obliged to accept them as 
true, which is not the case. Apparently the 
court was not convinced that the plaintiff had 
any justifiable excuse for not appearing at 
the trial, nor that he at the time in good 
faith desired to pursue the Utah action. 
And at Page 997, the court said: 
A prime requisite precedent to the granting of 
such relief is that the movant demonstrate that 
he comes to the court with clean hands and in 
good faith. His entire conduct as disclosed by 
the record negates this. 
Appellant's affidavit and mailgram show no "other" 
reason for setting aside the default and judgment upon 
which appellant can rely. Nowhere in his affidavit docs 
he say that he was not informed that his attorney had 
withdrawn, yet it is obvious from his rnailgr.Jm that he 
did know that he was not represented by counsel. He 
could get that information from any one of the three 
-10-
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mailings that were mailed to him by his former attorney, 
the court clerk, and opposing counsel, one of which was 
certified, and the very latest of those notices would 
have been received March 20, 1978, and all of the notices 
were addressed to his self-proclaimed address listed on 
the mailgram. The statement of the defendant that he 
received no notice of the hearing doesn't even apply to 
the matter of notice that his attorney had withdrawn, 
and he gives no explanation or reason for not taking 
steps to employ other counsel. He simply stated in the 
mailgram that he was attempting to employ local counsel, 
but for how long he was attempting to employ local coun-
sel he does not say, and it is what the defendant does 
not say that is so important here, because he has the 
duty of convincing the court that setting aside the 
default would be "in the furtherance of justice". Snow 
v. District Court in and for the City and County of 
Denver, Second Judicial District, 572 P.2d 475 (Colo. 
1977). Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 
P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
The position of the respondent is worthy of some 
consideration in the determination of justice. It has 
been approximately 3-1/2 years since the parties con-
tracted and respondent or his agents delivered money to 
-11-
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appellant solely and only because of the representations 
appellant made. !low much longer must respondent keep 
track of his witnesses and encourage them to keep their 
memories sharp and their recollections bright with respect 
to the incidents and conversations to meet the standard 
of proof necessary for fraud. How does respondent 
justify the expenditures necessary for depositions of 
each witness to preserve their testimony against fading 
recoll0ction due to age, removal from the State of 
Utah, and apathy, v1hen the probability that respondent 
will ever receive payment is slim at best. 
In American Savings & Loan Assn. v. Pierce, 28 Utah 
2d 76, 498 P.2d 648 (1972), the court said at Page 648: 
The main thrust of Christensen's appeal is that relief 
should have been granted by vacating the judgment 
on the ground of excusable neglect. The record 
does not reveal any excusable neglect of any kind. 
Contrarywise, it reveals not only irresponsible 
neglect, but a flaunting of procedural rules be-
yond judicial repair, repeated refusals to adhere 
to the discovery procedures, rendering suspect a 
disposition for unwarranted protraction and prose-
cution of the judicial process. 
In Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 
376 P.2d 951 (1962) cited in appellant's brief at Pages 
10 and ll, the court set up two basic criteria for set-
ting aside a default judgment, to wit: Reasonable 
justification or excuse and timely application to set 
it aside. The record is devoid of any reasonable excuse. 
-12-
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Appellant says on Page 7 of his brief that he was 
attending to business, as was the appellant in the 
Trumbo case, but he neglects to tell us what business 
he was attending to and why that business prevented him 
from receiving one of three notices sent to him. In 
Airkem Intermountain,·· Inc. v. Parker, supra, the court 
stated at Page 431: 
The trial court must balance two valid consider-
ations; on the one hand, to relieve the party 
of the judgment vitiates the effect of res 
judicata and creates a hardship for the success-
ful litigant by causing him to prosecute more 
than once his action and subjecting him to the 
possible loss of collecting his judgment. On 
the other hand, the court desires to protect 
the losing party who has-not had the· opportunity 
to present his claim or defense. The rule that 
the courts will incline toward granting relief 
to a party who has not had the opportunity to 
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the 
trial court level, and this court will not 
reverse the determination of the trial court 
merely because the .motion could have been granted. 
(emphasis added) 
POINT II 
THE REQUIREHENTS OF RULE 2.5 OF THE RULES OF 
PRACTICE WERE 11ET, AND SAID POINT HAS NOT 
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
The motion to set aside the judgment is based only 
upon Rules 60 (b) (1), (3), and (7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R.-97). Appellant's brief makes refer-
ence only to subsections (1) and (7), and subsection 
(3) has therefore been abandoned by appellant. Neither 
-13-
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in the motion nor in arguments did appellant give the 
trial court an opportunity to weigh the effect of Rule 
2.5 of the Rules of Practice, and the court should not 
consider that issue for the first time on appeal. 
General Appliance Corp. v. Haw, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 238, 
516 P.2d 346 (1973); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 
(Utah - 1978). 
A discussion between the court and counsel for 
respondent, led to the insertion of that notice in the 
notice of pretrial mailed by the court under date of 
March 17, 1978, because the certified letter sent by 
counsel for respondent had already been mailed on 
March 13, 1978. 
Inasmuch as the letter from the court clerk ad-
dressed to appellant at his admitted address was not 
returned, service is completed, and said defendant 
was given the notice contemplated under Rule 2.5. It 
is interesting to note that appellant complained that 
the provisions of Rule 2.5 were not met, while at the 
same time it is patently obvious from his mailgram that 
he knew what his responsibility was; and even more 
important, had the certified letter contained more 
specific notice he wouldn't have received it anyway, 
because he didn't bother to pick up the certified mail. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
~he total and only conclusion that can fairly be 
reached is that there's no way to serve the appellant 
if he doesn't want to be served. You can't serve him 
by personal service because he denies by affidavit that 
he was so served. You can't serve him by regular mail 
because he denies that he received the regular mail. 
You can't serve him by certified mail because he won't 
go pick it up, and appellant then wants to place the 
burden for lack of notice on counsel for respondent. 
The trial court had a perfect right to believe the testi-
mony of Mrs. Mower and that appellant's affidavit was 
neither accurate nor truthful and that appellant in fact 
received the notice sent by the clerk and the notice 
sent by his former attorney in sufficient time to require 
his attendance or representation at the pretrial, and 
that having already had two bites at the apple through 
a contradictory affidavit, appellant was not entitled to 
a third. 
Appellant did not want to spend the time or the 
money to defend this action if the judgment was simply 
against the corporation, and he gambled that there 
1vould be no personal judgment against him and simply 
hedged his bet with a mailgram. When he found out that 
-15-
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the judgment was against him personally as well as the 
corporation, he then decided to make his appearance 
through counsel and contest the validity of the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of December, 
1978. 
BlEAN :RAN ' -SMEDL~Y( 
-~~c/~C~z~ 
DAIID E. BEAN ' 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. f . 1:/;yt; d f 8 I certl y that on thls 'I__:.--· ay o December, 197 , 
I served David R. Ward, appellant's attorney of record, 
with two copies of respondent's brief by delivery at his 
office, 455 South 300 East, Suite 201, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
~16-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
